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1. Introduction 
When on March 17, 2011 Germany abstained on United Nation Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1973, which called for the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya, it 
faced harsh criticism. According to commentators, the German decision was based 
on a ―misplacedpacifist reflex, poor strategic thinking, and an incompetent Foreign 
Minister‖(Berenskoetter 2011: 10), it also ―caused quite a stir‖ (Lindström and 
Zetterlund 2012: 25) among Germany‘s allies. The criticism culminated as observers 
posed the question whether German foreign policy has gotten into a crisis (Maull 
2011: 95).  
Exactly twelve years earlier, German combat forces participated in the war against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which in contrast was not backed by a 
UNSC resolution and appeared to be a ―sign of growing maturity‖ (Mirow 2009: 47) of 
German foreign and security policy: for the first time since World War II, the country 
aggressively used force in international relations (Miskimmon 2009: 561), thereby 
marking a defining moment in the country‘s post-Cold War history. Looking at both 
cases in a comparative manner, at first sight each decision–i.e. the outcome of the 
decision-making process–constitutes a puzzle. Both cases exhibit striking similarities 
(Maull 2011: 105) whereas Germany‘s reaction differs immensely. In 1999 and 2011 
alike, a Western alliance used military power to save the population of a sovereign 
country from atrocities committed by their leaders. Thepuzzle manifests whilst looking 
at the differences in both cases. 1999‘s Operation Allied Force (OAF) was conducted 
without a United Nations (UN)-backed mandate by a German coalition government 
composed of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Alliance 
‗90/The Greens, which has its ideological roots in the pacifist movement 
(Brunstetterand Brunstetter 2011: 68; Mirow: 47). Indeed, the coalition agreement 
postulated that ―Deutsche Außenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik‖ (Sedlmayr 2008: 50). It 
also placed ―particular emphasis on strengthening the United Nations‖ (Maull 2000: 
5), which makes the decision even more surprising.However, Germany‘s role in the 
Kosovo War was considered to have a positive impact, as it ―demonstrated a maturity 
andseriousness found in very few other countries‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 31). In the case 
of 2011‘s Operation Unified Protector (OUP) instead, an internationally legitimized 
alliance intervened in Libya and the German governing coalition was not in principle 
averse to the use of force. Moreover, in the eleven years in between, the Federal 
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Republic of Germany overcame its reluctance to the use of force (Baumann and 
Hellmann 2001: 61) when it participated in the War in Afghanistan, as it did in Kosovo 
earlier. It follows that an intervention in Libyashould have been more likely than in 
Kosovo.  
Thus, this thesis strives to ascertain why Germany took part in the intervention in 
Kosovo, not being legitimized by the international community, whereas it opposed the 
intervention in Libya, which was in accordance with international law.     
 
The thesis shall shed light on both cases by employing Robert Putnam‘s two-level 
games theory (Putnam: 1988). Its core assumption is a government playing two 
simultaneous, intertwined games when negotiating a deal with a foreign country. The 
games on the domestic and the international level exert influence on each other. It is 
the executive negotiator‘s job to balance the two interacting games (Beach 2012: 
180). Putnam‘s theory can be used in a twofold way: it may describe and explain the 
outcomes of international negotiations or it may help analyze the outcome of 
domestic bargaining over a foreign policy issue. Since this paper‘s objective is to 
explain why a certain foreign policy option was chosen, it will be utilized in the latter 
way.  
Although Putnam‘s theory is the theoretical foundationof this analysis, it will be 
enhanced by various aspects which were found to be essential in different empirical 
studies and seem to be enriching when focusing on German policy making. In order 
to provide an analytical framework that best describes the outcomes of both empirical 
observations, the thesis will furthermore draw upon the role conception of Germany 
as a Civilian Power (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 3). This serves two distinct purposes: 
First, it helps identifying and defining the determinants of especially German foreign 
policy decision-making, which is a conceptual weakness of Putnam‘s theory 
(Oppermann 2008: 28), second, it helps understand policy change and takes into 
account long-term interests, which Putnam‘s theory doesnot, but which are crucial for 
answering the research question.  
 
The method employed is structured, focused comparison according to George and 
Bennett (2005). It is structured since a set of ―questions‖–derived from the research 
question and theoretical preliminary considerations–shall be applied to each case. It 
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is focused as the case studies focus only on certain aspects of the respective 
empirical phenomenon. In this way, comparable results can be generated.  
With the research design in hand, a contribution to understanding German foreign 
policy decision-making can be achieved. Most examinations of the abstention on 
Resolution 1973 were more of an essayistic or descriptive nature than theory-driven. 
A comparison with the case of Kosovo that takes into account relevant domestic 
influences on the decision-making process can hold against the notion that German 
foreign policy is erratic. It rather illustrates how each decision followed a rationale 
and–to a less important degree–how the foreign policy of Germany evolved between 
1999 and 2011 and how this very evolution affected the decision in March 2011 on 
the use of force against Libya‘s then-ruler Muammaral Gaddafi. In the end, the 
findings may contribute to a more predictable German foreign policy. 
 
To begin with, the theoretical basis of the thesis shall be outlined. The two-level 
games approach will reveal systemic and sub-systemic factors that influence foreign 
policy decision-making. With a narrow perspective on Germany, constraining 
elements in the domestic realm shall be described. Moreover, the influences of the 
international bargaining process on domestic decision-finding will be laid out. Certain 
aspects which go beyond Putnam‘s original formulation of two-level games—such as 
the role of public opinion—will be elaborated on.Having introduced the factors 
relevant for analysis according to the two-level theory, the role concept of Germany 
as a Civilian Power will be integrated into the analytical framework based on the 
assumption that only systemic and sub-systemic do not sufficiently explain the 
decisions in Kosovo and Libya. Subsequently, the most pertinent institutions of the 
domestic decision-making process will be delineated quickly. Four hypotheses will 
then be generated that guide the empirical part. By means of applying those to each 
case, the domestic actors and their preferences will be examined. In a second step, 
the costs and benefits which are relevant to those actors and which shape the actors‘ 
preferences will be evaluated. The influence of the chief negotiator on the domestic 
outcome is another aspect central to the analysis of the case studies. Finally, the 
influences of the international level on the decision shall be clarified. Conclusively, 
the results will be discussed to develop a useful synthesis.  
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2. The Theoretical Framework of Analysis 
 
The starting point of this analysis is to lay out the theoretical framework. It will be 
shown that the two-level games theory, while looking closely at domestic factors of 
foreign policy decision-finding, can be specified by combining its assumptions with 
the role concept of Germany. 
 
2.1 A Game on Two Levels: Domestic Constraints of Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making 
 
As Moravcsik (1993) assessed, ―all sophisticated theories of international relations 
[…] concede that domestic actors are active participants in foreign policy-making.‖ 
Putnam‘s theory contributed significantly to opening up the black box of states as 
unitary actors in foreign policy. Not only did he achieve to connect systemic and sub-
systemic variables, he also drove forward the exchange between two sub-disciplines 
of political science, namely International Relations and Comparative Politics. His 
approach may therefore be classified as a neo-institutionalist one (Oppermann 2008: 
18-21).  
The core assumption of Putnam‘s theory is the metaphor of a statesman 
simultaneously negotiating on two levels: on the domestic level, called Level II, he 
depends on the preferences and relative bargaining power of domestic actors, on the 
international level, called Level I, he seeks to maximize the outcome of international 
agreements (Moravcsik 1993: 15). Functioning as the gatekeeper betweenthe two 
levels, he has to balance domestic and international imperatives. Level I and II are 
interrelated by the theoretical concept of ratification: every agreement on Level II has 
to be ratified on Level I (Oppermann 2008: 23; Putnam 1988: 436).  
For the purpose of this thesis, Putnam‘s theory will not be used as a theory of 
international negotiations but as an instrument of foreign policy-making analysis, 
because it examines national government‘s incentives for actions, the possible policy 
options and choices of strategy (Oppermann 2008: 37). Thus, foreign policy is the 
simultaneous interaction of both levels (Tilly 2011: 162). Putnam introduces four 
determinants with whom the domestic win-set can be identified.  
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2.1.1 Determining the Domestic Win-Set 
Prior to detailing the determinants, one must define the term most essential to the 
analysis: a win-set can be defined  
 
―for a given Level II constituency as the set of all possible Level I 
agreements that would ‗win‘—that is, gain the necessary majority among 
the constituents—when simply voted up or down‖ (Putnam 1988: 437).  
 
From this definition becomes evident that the win-set is the explaining variable which 
allows it to assess the policy option an executive has. This in turn renders it possible 
to draw conclusions with regards to the decisions of those executives (Oppermann 
2008: 37f). According to Putnam, the size of the win-set depends on the one hand 
―on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II 
constituents‖ (Putnam 1988: 442). Preferences in turn are formed by costs and 
benefits, and coalitions are formed according to the distribution of costs and benefits 
(Moravcsik 1993: 24). The higher either costs or benefits from a Level I agreement, 
the more a domestic actor will exert pressure on the executive to pursue his interest 
(Putnam 1988: 445).1Coalitions may be interest groups, political parties, individuals 
etc. Another noteworthy factor is the degree to which an issue is politicized, for this 
has an effect on the mobilization of domestic actors and equally on the size of the 
win-set (Oppermann 2008: 40; Putnam 1988: 445). 
On the other hand, the ―size of the win-set depends on the Level II political 
institutions‖ (Putnam 1988: 448). The institutional rules attribute relative power to the 
domestic actors and the executive and thereby determine which Level II constituents 
possess (formal or informal) veto power as well as the state‘s degree of autonomy. 
As a general rule the size of the win-set increases if the autonomy of decision-
makers does (Putnam 1988: 449). On a related note: the longer international 
negotiations endure, and by this, the ―more clearly international options become 
defined, the more leaders are constrained by mobilized interest groups‖ (Evans 1993: 
399). If the preferences of executive and domestic actor are not congruent, the 
ratification process is the constraining element (Oppermann 2008: 39). But only 
                                            
1
 It should be noted that the executive also pursues interests and forms coalitions among the Level II 
constituents. Its overall interest is to safeguard its power (Putnam 1988: 435).  
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those actors with veto power (be it formal or informal) have the power to hamper 
ratification (Mo 1994: 405; Zangl 1994: 296f). Hence, the ratification process is keyfor 
understanding the constraints a decision-maker is subject to: 
 
―the requirement that any Level I agreement must, in the end, be ratified 
at Level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two levels. 
‗Ratification‘ may entail […] any decision-process at Level II that is 
required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally 
or informal‖ (Putnam 1988: 436).  
 
Ratification is understood in an extensive scope: it encompasses formal ratification 
such as a parliamentary voting which is dichotomous—the ratifier simply votes up or 
down—or informal ratification which ―provides a continuous constraint on the 
executive― (Pahre 2003: 3), such as public opinion. Preferences are constant during 
the ratification procedure, yet the statesman has numerous possibilities to manipulate 
it: for example, the influence may extend to manipulating voting rules, setting the 
agenda, changing the domestic balance by means of side-payments, or using 
information asymmetries in their favor (Oppermann 2008: 23). The statesman‘s 
leeway to influence domestic constraints rests on different factors: the concentration 
of domestic groups and the extent to which they are informed about a certain 
agreement as well the effects of a potential pre-commitment. In this context,―the more 
diffuse the costs and benefits of the proposed agreement, the more possibilities for 
statesmen to target swing groups and gain their support at relatively low costs‖ 
(Moravcsik 1993: 26; see: 2.1.3).  
 
The failure of ratificationposes a risk to international (non-enforceable) agreements. 
Two types of defection may occur: a ―rational egoist‖ (Putnam 1988: 438) may defect 
from an agreement if this is advantageous to him (voluntary defection). Although this 
is a particular problem of collective action, voluntary defection bears little incentive for 
policy-makers which are reiteratively engaged in negotiations (Putnam 1988: 438). 
The event of a negotiator not being able to comply with its promises (Involuntary 
defection), however, is more frequent. The smaller the win-set is, the higher the risk 
of defecting involuntarily. Due to situations of uncertainty and domestic asymmetrical 
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information, ―negotiators themselves are uncertain about their own constraints, [so 
those] make successful international agreement difficult by entailing ‗involuntary 
defection‘‖ (Iida 1993: 417). Or put differently, governments may overestimate their 
win-set, which results in the effect of an agreement not being ratified ex-post.  
Any government has an electoral interest to aim for domestic approval of 
international agreements (Oppermann 2008: 27). Due to this calculation, 
―perceptions of domestic constraints are just as important as the actual constraints 
themselves‖ (Iida 1993: 418).In order to advance Putnam‘s theory, Iida (1993) 
elaborated on uncertainty about domestic politics. In reality, complete information is 
not given and as a result, the negotiator may perceive domestic constraints—be they 
factual or not—which limit his scope of action.  
The idea that governments have an electoral interest and the public, as follows, can 
never be ignored by decision-makers, was promoted by Pahre (2003). Even if the 
public does not exercise formal veto power, the activities of non-veto powers may 
impose high electoral costs on the government. The anticipation of such ―audience 
costs‖ (Pahre 2003: 15) can have a significant impact on the decision-making 
process of the government. In furtherance of understanding the weight of electoral 
costs, Shamir and Shikaki (2005) untangled the vague specification of public opinion 
in two-level theory literature.2 According to their research, public opinion goes beyond 
the figures depicted in opinion polls and is far more multifaceted. Public opinion also 
contains a normative component which is ―referred to as the ‗climate of opinion‘, the 
‗national spirit‘ […] or Zeitgeist‖ (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 312) and a behavioral 
component which delves into the forms of expressions, e.g. public speeches and 
debates. Moreover, public opinion is more susceptible to ―framing efforts [than] other 
level II actors‖ (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 313). Public opinion is shaped by and large 
by two things: the interpretation and information about events by the media and 
―symbolic gestures […], such as historical responsibility acknowledgements‖ (Shamir 
and Shikaki 2005: 313), to which it reacts sensitively. ―Thus,when disputes have an 
acute symbolicdimension, negotiators have an incentive toconverge on ambiguous 
formulations in thehope of facilitating public approval‖ (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 
                                            
2
 As aforementioned, the development of the theory seeks an optimal operationalization with a view to 
German foreign policy-making. It will be shown that public opinion is a key element in analyzing the 
empirical cases and therefore, it is extensively developed here.  
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313f).3 Notably, not only may negotiators influence their own domestic win-set, but 
also the wins-set of their bargaining partners (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 325). This 
feature of two-level games—the repercussions of Level I players—will be presented 
in the following. 
 
2.1.2 Level I Influences: Strategies of Bargaining Partners 
Being present on both levels, governments obtain strategic autonomy of action 
(Moravcsik 1993: 15; Milner 1997: 34). Similar to Level II behavior, they try to 
manipulate the international level in a like manner (Oppermann 2008: 40). So as to 
enlarge the win-set of bargaining partners, they can make use of three strategies.  
One of those strategies is reverberation. Actions in one state directly influence the 
win-set of the bargaining partner, either by concessions or by threats from the foreign 
country, which can either have positive effects on domestic constraints (i.e. 
expanding the domestic win-set) or create an unintended backlash, hence making 
international agreement more difficult as the win-set shrinks (Putnam 1988: 454ff; 
Dash 2008: 25). Another tactic would be to ―raise the cost of no-agreement to key 
constituents on the other side‖ (Moravcsik 1993: 29). This can be facilitated by 
employing transnational side-payments or issue linkages which are aimed at 
powerful domestic actors (Oppermann 2008: 29f). Side-payments are understood as 
measures to generate higher benefits for a certain group (Putnam 1988: 450). Issue 
linkage is the ―strategicpooling of distinct bargaining items into a package deal‖ 
(Oppermann 2008: 28; author‘s translation). Finally, the strategy of collusion is used 
to the advantage of arranging an agreement. Another government is strengthened by 
its partners through raising its domestic popularity, e.g. by attributing certain 
negotiation successes to the respective government whose domestic support is then 
reinforced vis-à-vis strong domestic opponents of the international agreement 
(Oppermann 2008: 31; Zangl 1995: 402).  
 
A commonly mentioned concept of Level I-Level II interdependence is related to 
reshaping domestic constraints in order to reach a more favorable bargaining 
position (Moravcsik 1993: 28). Negotiators may attempt to use the strategy of tying 
                                            
3
 The fourth facet outlined in this research, the ―prospective informational facet [as] public opinion in 
the world of economists‖ (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 313) will be omitted for the sake of simplicity.  
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hands (reducing the size of the win-set to gain more bargaining power) or of cutting 
slack (enlarging the size of the win-set to make international agreement more likely) 
(Putnam 1988: 449; Moravcsik 1993: 28). However, it has been demonstrated 
empirically that governments, in general, do have more incentive to cut slack than to 
tie hands (Evans 1993: 399; Mo 1994: 403; Moravcsik 1994: 56; Oppermann 2008: 
36).  
 
2.1.3 The Role of the Chief Negotiator 
Given the strategically central role of the gatekeeper, his own preferences have a 
remarkable impact on the outcome of international negotiations. Precisely because 
he holds the monopoly of representation at Level I, a rational chief negotiator may 
purse his own interests at Level I and influence domestic constraints at Level II. He 
does so under circumstances of uncertainty and incomplete information (Moravcsik 
1993: 23; Oppermann 2008: 24f). 
Initially, the chief negotiator‘s motives should be summarized briefly. He may either 
work towards a better political position at Level II, or he may as well pursue his 
personally favored concepts at Level I (Putnam 1988: 457). It is assumed that his 
primary objective is to stay in power (Oppermann 2008: 25). So at the beginning, his 
ways of influencing domestic constraintsby using the power resources at his 
disposalwhich has already been mentioned above (see 2.1.1), will be evaluated. 
Similar to Level I behavior, chief negotiators can use issue linkages to gain the 
necessary approval among constituents within the nation state. Next and also 
analogous to Level I, side-payments are aimed at actors whose consent is critical for 
facilitating international agreement. The chief negotiator may also choose to exploit 
his control over information. This enables him to mobilize important actors selectively 
(Oppermann 2008: 26-33). The extent to which he is able to influence domestic 
constraints and thereby, the win-set, solely depends on his relative bargaining power 
vis-à-vis domestic actors. Moravcsik (1994: 4) offers four political resources 
describing this relative bargaining power. For the analysis, the control over agenda 
setting power (initiative), procedural rules for ratification of an international 
agreement (institution), political and technical knowledge and costs of collecting and 
analyzing information (information), and justification of policies ―with reference to the 
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realization of common abstract values‖ (Moravcsik 1994: 14) (ideas) can be looked 
at.  
Of course, a statesman has the power to veto any agreement (Putnam 1988: 457). 
Aside from that fact, his own preferences do have crucial impact on the outcome of 
the international bargaining process. So, within the scope of the domestic win-set, he 
may negotiate according to his own preferences (Moravcsik 1993: 23), or in other 
words, his acceptability-set (Moravcsik 1993: 30).4 This concept is based on the 
assumption that executive and legislative are subject to a principal-agent relationship 
(Putnam 1988: 456; Tilly 2011: 163). Accordingly, three distinct types of chief 
negotiators exist. Acting as an agent of the domestic constituents, the chief 
negotiator‘s acceptability-set― reflects the interests of the median domestic group and 
is encompassed by the domestic win-set‖ (Moravcsik 1993: 31). In the case of the 
chief-negotiator being a dove, his acceptability-set is closer to the acceptability-set of 
bargaining partners than the domestic win-set. Finally, in the case of an executive 
acting as hawk, his acceptability set is ―further from the opposing win-set‖ (Moravcsik 
1993: 31) than the domestic win-set (Evans 1993: 406; Moravcsik 1993: 31; Tilly 
2011: 163; Zangl 1995: 403). 
Taken as a whole, the chief negotiator has a rich array of strategies he can use, 
which substantially alter the games on Level I and Level II. From the explication 
above, the most important restraining parameters of foreign-policy making became 
clear, as well as the interaction of bargaining and ratification phase and the pitfalls 
revolving around it. Despite Putnam‘s valuable input for studying domestic influences 
on foreign policy, his theory lacks a coherent identification and conceptualization of 
the determinants which are central to the analysis of win-sets (Oppermann 2008: 11). 
These factors are not systematically integrated in a general analytical frame in a way 
that they could be generalizablyoperationalized (Milner 1997: 233f; Oppermann 
2008: 41). The integration of the German role conceptmay partially compensate for 
these conceptual weaknesses. 
 
                                            
4
 The concept of the specification of the statesmen‘s preferences was introduced by Moravcsik (1993) 
in order to mirror not only the preferences of the society—as Putnam (1988) initially did—but also the 
preferences of the executive (Zangl 1995: 399).  
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2.2 Germany’s Role Conception: an Attempt to Enhancing Putnam’s 
Theory 
 
In Putnam‘s rational choice theory, costs and benefits are of pivotal interest since 
approval of and opposition to an international agreement are fostered by the 
distribution of gains and losses (Evans 1993: 399). Since the analysis covers 
German policy-making exclusively, one cannot sufficiently examine the cost-benefit-
relation if one does not take into account the expectations of bargaining partners 
towards German decision-making. They are especially important in the case of post-
unification Germany foreign policy. To that end, the German role concept as a 
Civilian Power is considered to enrich the analysis for it grasps central factors which 
inevitably influence German foreign policy-making to a high degree.  
Prior to integrating the role concept in the two-level theory, one must define this 
constructivist (Maull 2007: 75) approach. States can have different role conceptions 
which are expressed in guiding principles of foreign policy (Maull 2007: 74). The 
particular German ―role concept as Civilian Power describes a basic foreign policy 
orientation which aims at civilizing politics altogether and international relations in 
particular‖ (Maull 2007: 74; author‘s translation). Thus, it is a  
 
―state that sought to pursue its foreign and domestic objectives primarily 
through political and economic means, and which was committed to 
multilateral co-operation and strengthening international law‖ (Hyde-Price 
2001: 31).  
 
Specifically, this role concept translates into the values of Westbindung (West 
integration), a multilateral character of foreign policy and a profound skepticism of 
military means in international relations (Gareis 2006: 50; Kudnani 2011: 31f).  The 
concomitant ―complex bundle of norms, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions‖ (Maull 
2000: 14) does not only shape Germany‘s foreign policy behavior and deeply affect 
foreign policy goals, but also the expectations of its international partners (Maull 
2007: 74). The basic guidelines shape foreign policy conduct because they are 
embedded in the self-perception of the political elite and the population (Maull 2007: 
81).  
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Despite the permanence of the role concept, changes and modifications may occur. 
They are indicated by learning processes which in turn are fuelled by effects of 
socialization and significant historical experiences (Maull 2000: 14). Drawing upon 
this concept can help to assess modifications in German foreign policy behavior 
(Greis 2013: 234). 
Bearing in mind that this thesis will explain the use of force or the refusal to do so, it 
is worth to briefly examine the concept‘s propositions regarding coercive policy. 
Skepticism about military means is not equal with ―a pacifist renunciation of the use 
of military force under any circumstances‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 32), but it is rather a 
means of last resort. If several criteria are met, like the exhaustion of civil conflict 
resolution mechanisms, the multilateral character of coercive measures, and a 
manner proportionate to the goals of the use of force, armed intervention is 
consistent with the Civilian Power concept (Raith 2005: 53). Although Germany‘s 
foreign policy is based on normative values, those values may not always be 
compatible (Maull 2000: 15). Yet the essence of the section is the provision of a 
framework that enables to adequately analyze the relevant factors that constrain 
German foreign policy-making. 
 
3. Structural Conditions of German Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
 
Before one may assess the de facto constraints of the Kosovo and Libya cases, the 
institutional configuration of German decision-making has to be elucidated. The 
formal rules are the foundation of foreign policy-making. According to the Basic Law, 
foreign policy is the prerogative of the Federal Government, holding the right of 
initiative, and within the government, the Federal Chancellor who has the right to set 
guidelines (Gareis 2006: 35f). 
The Bundestag may ―oppose military action at any time‖ (Miskimmon 2009: 569). In a 
judgment in 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the deployment of the 
Bundeswehr requires a simple majority (Geis 2013: 232). This implies that the 
parliament cannot amend any proposal by the executive but it can only approve or 
oppose (Gareis 2006: 40f).  
Beside the central institutional position of the Federal Chancellor, the foreign minister 
and the minister of defense have an important function in foreign policy-making. The 
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foreign minister as chief of the Federal Foreign Office is responsible for foreign policy 
(Gareis 2006: 37f). The relation of chancellor and foreign minister may be dualistic—
if they are from separate parties, the foreign minister is relatively strong vis-à-vis the 
chancellor (Collschen 2010: 69). The minister of defense is the commander-in-chief 
in peacetimes and responsible for military policy (Geis 2013: 232). 
All in all, Germany‘s parliamentary governmental institutional structure is a crucial 
restraining element in foreign policy (Auerswald 2004: 642). It is characterized by 
decentralized division of competences (Gareis 2006: 35).  
 
The theoretical framework—a two-level theory brought together with the Civilian 
Power role concept—now opens up the possibility to develop guiding questions that 
can be equally applied to the Kosovo and the Libya case to the end that the 
respective win-set is extracted from the analysis, or rather: the exact point within the 
win-set that is the result of the decision-making process—intervention or non-
intervention. First, the configuration of relevant domestic actors will be evaluated as 
well as the formal and informal constraints of ratification. Second, the preferences of 
the relevant actors will be looked at closely since coalitions align along the costs and 
benefits. Third, the distinct role of the chief negotiator will be examined, i.e. his 
influence on domestic constraints and his own acceptability-set. Fourth, the 
influences of Level I on the domestic level shall be explored which are twofold: 
Influences are on the one hand strategies of bargaining partners trying to extending 
the German win-set in their favor, on the other hand the expectations of Germany‘s 
bargaining partners (in terms of the role concept) which influence domestic decision-
making. Each question, during the course of examination, will make recourse to the 
theoretical premises outlined in the sections above. 
4. Comparison of the Interventions in Kosovo and Libya 
 
In both cases, the decision-making process is the center of analysis. Nevertheless, 
where it seems appropriate, events after the decision-making process will be 
included into the research ex post. This will only be done insofar as it helps shedding 
light on decisions made. 
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4.1 Germany’s Participation in the Kosovo War 1998-99 
 
Inspite of a looming major international crisis in Kosovo, the electoral campaign in 
Germany did not attach high importance tothis foreign policy issue. The more fateful 
its impact for the newly elected Red-Green government was when it had to pass its 
first litmus test even before it assumed office (Sedlmayr 2008: 51). The situation in 
Kosovo worsened from spring 1998 on. The fights between the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosove – UCK) and Serb forces under the command of 
Milosevic became more frequent and more severe. Just at this stage, the 
international community became involved in the conflict. It was not until September 
1988—during and after the election phase in Germany—that the German 
government took a decision (Krause 2000: 406f). This thesis will narrow down the 
time frame especially to the time after September 1988, since ―domestically, the most 
important decisions were taken within the transitional phase‖ (Geis 2013: 252). 
Certainly, relevant events prior to September 1988 will be taken into account when 
necessary.  
Another important remark is referring to the formal decision by the Bundestag on 
October 16, 1998. This cannot be mistakenly seen as the endpoint of the decision-
making process, on the contrary: the theory implies that informal ratification, e.g. 
approval by public opinion or party conventions, is equally important; as long as the 
agreement is not implemented (i.e. as long as the air strikes are not successfully 
executed), defection is possible.5 This crucial implication of the theory has 
consequences for the timeframe being analyzed. Also, the Schröder government 
could have introduced ―another motion to the Bundestag in which the decision to 
participate in a possible NATO campaign would be taken back, or it could have 
refused to deploy any soldiers and aircraft when the operation would be launched‖ 
(Brummer 2012: 279). Likewise, this justifies the research period. 
 
                                            
5
 One may refer to the Green‘s special party convention that was held after the airstrikes were 
launched. If the party had not approved, this would have possibly resulted in a breakdown of the 
government coalition (Miskimmon 2009: 564f). In light of the theory, this would have constituted an 
instance of involuntary defection. According to the theory, this would have initiated a new game on 
Level II (Oppermann 2008: 27). 
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4.1.1 The Domestic Actors 
―[R]atification takes the form of allowing the executive to stay in office and prosecute 
the conflict‖ (Auerswald 2004: 658). Due to that, three domestic actors can be 
identified which were of exorbitant importance: the Bundestag, the public opinion and 
the Greens party. 
The Bundestag was overall supportive of mandating the Bundeswehr to intervene in 
Kosovo in the event that the situation would further deteriorate (Friedrich 2005: 55). 
The causes for this can be seen in a unique situation: after the elections, the new 
Bundestag has not yet been constituted (Friedrich 2005: 54). A timely approval of the 
Bundestag had to be reached after the government decided to contribute militarilyto a 
possible NATO mission in Kosovo (Deutscher Bundestag 1998b: 1). So the 
opposition—still the SPD and the Greens—and the government agreed upon 
convening a special session of the Bundestag on October 16, 1998. The request of 
the government for a ―Beteiligung an den von der NATO geplanten und in Phasen 
durchzuführenden Luftoperationen zur Abwendung einer humanitären Katastrophe 
im Kosovo-Konflikt‖6 (Deutscher Bundestag 1998b: 1) was approved by a large 
majority (Loquai 2000: 113f). 500 Members of Parliament (MPs) voted in favor, 62 
rejected and 18 abstained from the vote (Geis 2013: 249). Indeed, the ―debate was 
remarkable for its lack of controversy‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 21).  
The absence of strong opposition is of course due to fact that the old and the new 
government worked closely together. On October 12, Kohl summoned the old and 
new foreign ministers, Kinkel and Fischer, as well as the soon-to-be-Chancellor 
Schröder for finding a decision on a possible German contribution to the NATO 
intervention (Friedrich 2005: 54).7 The old governing parties, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) and Free Democratic Party 
(FDP) coalition, worked in the preface of the escalation of the Kosovo conflict 
towards its resolution. As Kinkel said in a Bundestag plenary sessionas early as June 
1998: ―Wir werden alles tun, um der Gewalt im Kosovo ein Ende zu bereiten―8 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1998a: 22419). When four months later, the designated 
                                            
6
 Author`s translation: contribution to the NATO-planned airstrike, which is to be implemented in 
phases, for the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe in the Kosovo conflict.   
7
 Already on September 30, the old government decided to make elevenTornado jet fighters available 
for NATO operation. Even this decision was taken in accordance with Fischer and Schröder as they 
were involved in all decisions—at least—since the day of their electoral victory (Friedrich 2005: 50).  
8
 Author‘s translation: We will do everything to put an end to violence in Kosovo.  
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Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer reinforced Kinkel‘s statement in the Bundestag, the 
old and the new government were completely in line:  
 
―Wir entscheiden heute über die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an einem 
Militäreinsatz der NATO, von dem wir alle hoffen und Gott sei Dank 
begründet hoffen können, daß [sic!] er niemals stattfinden muß [sic!] und 
stattfinden wird― (Bundestag 1998c: 23141). 
 
The goal of the air strikes against Serbia was the desire to stop a humanitarian 
catastrophe. Moreover, a frequently used argument was to utilize the use of force as 
a deterrent against Milosevic who would, according to the advocates of an 
intervention, not give in. The need of Germany to show Bündnisfähigkeit, with 
recurrence to the German history and also the failures during the Bosnia conflict 
which led to the massacre of Srebrenica were often articulated too (Geis 2013: 249f).   
The only formal veto-power—aside from the executive—was highly supportive of an 
intervention. The Bundestag‘s consensus was of long continuance. Hypothetically, 
the mandate could have beenrevised under specific circumstances, but its character 
as a ―Vorratsbeschluss‖ was confirmed by the Federal Ministry of Justice (Friedrich 
2005: 70). Defection of this actor was rather unlikely, so its role in augmenting 
domestic support was significant. 
 
The broad consent within the array of political parties resembled the sentiment of the 
public opinion. Popular support of the war against Serb forces even was „surprisingly 
strong‖ (Auerswald 2004: 640). A poll conducted in July 1998 indicated 48 percent 
approval for a potential intervention and 48 percent opposition to it. The support grew 
as the tensions in Kosovo rose: After the beginning of the air strikes, 60 percent 
approved of the German participation in the military action against Milosevic‘s forces 
(Geis 2013: 252). 52 percent of Germans even were willing to accept the loss of lives 
of German soldiers, 72 percent approved of the use of force (Maull 2000: 10). Such 
figures depict that the decision ―represent[s] the[…] views of a majority of the 
electorate‖ (Auerswald 2004: 640).  
The change of the reluctance to the use of force in the German publiccan be traced 
back the events in former Yugolsavia (Maull 2000: 9), as to the coercive force was 
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seen as an indispensable step to prevent a possible genocide in Kosovo (Eilders and 
Lüter 2000: 423). The justification of the war was driven forward by framing efforts of 
the government: As a member of NATO and due to a moral obligation towards the 
Kosovar-Albanian population the government justified its actions (Eilders and Lüter 
2000: 417). It furthermore called upon the sense of responsibility which stems from 
the lessons learnt during World War II (Eilders and Lüter 2000: 421). The 
government‘s framing strategy was underpinned by the debate in the media. Two of 
the largest German newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), made the case for the necessity of intervening for 
humanitarian causes. Although their coverage differed, the tenor was consensual 
(Geis 2013: 251). Clearly, the government successfully attempted to influence 
domestic constraints. Among the electorate, there was a decisive aversion to the 
deployment of ground troops (Maull 2000: 10), which has never been genuinely 
discussed in the German political realm. There have not been any large 
demonstrations (Geis 2013: 251), so the German government did not have to fear 
significant audience costs. The German Red-Green government could also build on 
additional legitimization: it was always highly skeptical of the use of the Bundeswehr 
and accordingly, it enjoyed greater credibility in military affairs (Geis 2013: 251; 
Schwab-Trapp 2002: 291).  
 
Closely related with this is the role of the German Green party, which has never 
before participated in government. As the junior partner in the governing coalition, its 
hypothetical opposition to the intervention would have resulted in a breakdown of the 
SPD/The Greens coalition (Auerswald 2004: 656; Brummer 2012: 286). The Greens 
have their roots in pacifism, manifested in its strong pacifist wing (Brunstetter and 
Brunstetter 2011: 65; Maull 2000: 7) and therefore, the decision to take part in the air 
campaign against Serb forces was highly controversial (Eilders and Lüter 2000: 416; 
Hyde-Price 2001: 25). Indeed, ―this was a crisis even bigger and more threatening 
than any other the party had weathered over two decades‖ (Hockenos 2008: 268). 
The intra-party dispute divided over the distinct German, history-induced axiom of 
―never again‖ and the conclusions for German politics: Whereas the radical pacifist 
wing interpreted the very essence of the party as ―never again war‖, the realo-wing 
adhered to ―never again Auschwitz‖, which meant not to tolerate ethnic cleansing 
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(Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011: 72). At the special party convention on May 13, 
1999, solely dealing with the Kosovo crisis, 58 percent of the delegatestolerated the 
decision of the government to intervene (Krause 2000: 20). This result was only 
accounted for by the persistent attempts of Fischer to resolve the conflict 
diplomatically (Brummer 2012: 286; Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011: 73), thereby 
containing opposition and living up to the pacifist ideals of the party (Hyde-Price 
2001: 27).  
 
It can be inferred from the aforesaid that no domestic actor vetoed the agreement, 
and the possibility of defection was minimized by the executive influencing the 
public—by means of its agenda-setting power—and acknowledging the Green party‘s 
pacifist ideals. Ratification therefore effected by means of approval. Acting in line with 
the public‘s preference safeguarded the retention of power. As postulated by the 
theory, insights on the scope of action allow conclusions to be drawn about the 
behavior of the government (Oppermann 2008: 38). So far, the choice pro 
intervention seems to be the logical result while looking at the domestic actors. The 
following section will unravel the costs and benefits.  
 
4.1.2 Cost-Benefit Calculation 
Preferences matter considerably: Coalitions shape alongside costs and benefits and 
they determine the stake an actor has in the game (Moravcsik 1993: 24). Oftentimes, 
costs and benefits are allocated diffusely between the actors, so that multiple actors 
may be affected by costs or benefits. Hence, the distribution of positive and negative 
gains for every relevant actor cannot be assessed exhaustively. 
Only 438 of 38,000 operations were conducted by Germany, which accounts for 1.3 
percent of all deployments (Friedrich 2005: 93). The monetary expenses are 
negligible. The benefits in terms of enhancing reputation are, on the contrary, not.  
A strong interest of the German government in stabilizing the Balkan can be proofed. 
The alleged aspirations of the FYR to widen the influence in the Balkans were to be 
counteracted by Germany (Friedrich 2005: 125f; Sedlmayr 2008: 168). A 
destabilization of the Balkans was feared which could have had negative effects for 
the eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) (Krause 2000: 400). The 
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Kosovo War even bore the risk to lead to a bigger war in Europe through spill-over 
effects (Baumann 2001: 174). The disintegration of Yugoslavia as a part of Europe 
would have caused disturbances of economic and political stability at the periphery of 
the EU. Germany, which sees the EU as a root cause for its wealth, had a substantial 
motivation to react to the threat of instability at its frontier (Daalder and O‘Hanlon 
2000: 12): 
 
―Another large-scale civil war in Yugoslavia with uncontrollable 
consequences for Albania and Macedonia was seen as too big a threat 
for the rest of Europe‖ (Geis 2013: 253).9 
 
This rather vague calculation can be enhanced in a more accurate manner. Not 
participating in an intervention could have proven far more costly: On the other hand, 
and similar to the German behavior in the forefront of the Gulf War 1990-1, a refusal 
to participate actively would have required the Germans to compensate by means of 
its ―chequebook diplomacy‖ (Overhaus 2003: 55; Der Spiegel1999). From a 
monetary cost minimization point of view the contribution of forces was more 
favorable than non-participation (Mahnke 2008: 64). The contribution to the Gulf 
War–DM 17 billion (Auswärtiges Amt 1995: 793)–exceeded the costs for the Kosovo 
War by far. The calculated sum the military contribution amounted to DM 620 million 
(Lambeck 1999). A more extensive conflict with ground troops, thereby producing 
higher costs, was not to be expected (Daalder and O‘Hanlon 2000: 204) and the 
German government anticipated an impermanent war, inhering a calculable risk 
(Ignatieff 2000: 12). 
The actions of the government were to a large extent driven by the refugee issue 
which has a political and an economic dimension. By June 1998, Germany had 
already received 140,000 refugees.According to Foreign Minister Kinkel on June 4, 
1998, the priority for a NATO engagement would have to be to secure the Albanian 
and Macedonian borders in order to ensure that refugees remain in the region 
(Friedrich 2005: 41). This illustrates the importance the German government 
attached to the subject of refugees from the beginning of the conflict on. The situation 
                                            
9
 In fact, the situation regarding intra-ethnical tensions in Macedonia improved after stabilization of 
Kosovo (Troebst 2000: 227).  
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exacerbated in September when 270,000 people were fleeing (Friedrich 2005: 47) so 
that Germany could have expected the arrival of more refugees (Auerswald 2004: 
639; Maull 2000: 13). As a reference value for the financial burdens, the costs for 
300,000 refugees from the Bosnia Crisis may be brought in: up to 1999, the 
expenditures amounted to DM 20 billion (Deutscher Bundestag 1998a: 23136). 
Besides economic considerations, the electoral costs could have proven fatal since 
the German population predominantly showed a reluctant attitude towards receiving 
more refugees in addition to the 140,000 refugees present in Germany (Maull 2000: 
4). And indeed, the 90 percent of the Kosovar-Albanian population that fled their 
homes were able to return to their homes after the war (Webber 2009: 454), proving 
the German calculus right.  
 
A number of other factors are relevant in the face of cost-benefit-calculations, such 
as the costs inflicted by the loss of reliability when not joining OAF, or the damage to 
reputation when not stepping in for a humanitarian cause, as well as the power 
political gain from employing a diplomatic strategy. Those aspects will be dealt with 
when discussing the influence of the role conception.  
 
4.1.3 The Role of the Chief-Negotiator 
As discussed in the theoretical part, in the German political system two persons are 
of central interest: the chancellor and the foreign minister. The crisis in Kosovo 
coincided with a change of government in September 1988, so two persons have to 
be examined each.  
 
Starting with Chancellor Kohl, he did not ambitiously join in the discussion when the 
crisis was escalating slowly (Friedrich 2005: 46). His policy towards the partners in 
the Balkan Contact Group can be described asrather reactive (Krause 2000: 404) 
and no personal preferences can be evaluated. It is therefore more rewarding to 
examine Schröder‘s personal preferences, i.e. his acceptability set. 
Gerhard Schröder highlighted the notion that Germany‘s past demanded action and 
there was no alternative to actively engage in the possible NATO campaign 
(Brummer 2012: 280). His mindset can be exemplified by the ―impassionate speech, 
24 
 
full of conviction and determination‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 25) which he gave at the 
SPD‘s special party convention:  
 
―Die verantwortliche, sozialdemokratisch geführte Bundesregierung hatte 
keine andere Wahl, als alle, aber auch wirklich alle Mittel zu nutzen, um 
diesem Treiben Milosevics ein Ende zu bereiten. Dies ist das einzige Motiv 
für unser Handeln, das wir alle teilen― (Vorstand der SPD 1999: 38f).   
 
Not least because of Schröder‘s efforts, a majority of SPD members supported the 
campaign against Milosevic‘s forces (Hyde-Price 2001: 25).  
What is equally important is Schröder‘s motive to boost his political image. He strived 
to portray Germany as a reliable partner and show the Red-Green‘s coalition ability to 
govern Germany (Brummer 2012: 284; Schröder 2007: 84). The background of his 
endeavors was criticism Schröder faced during the election campaign for a ―lack of 
substance‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 24). Germany‘s allies were skeptical if Schröder‘s 
government was as steadfast as the Kohl government (Friedrich 2005: 71), in 
particular in ―times of significant changes‖ (Brummer 2012: 284). Schröder made 
clear that ―[j]eder im In- und Ausland kann sich darauf verlassen, daß [sic!] diese 
Regierung zu ihrer politischen [...] Verantwortung steht―10 (Deutscher Bundestag 
1998d: 49).  Demonstrating his continuous support for the government‘s decision on 
October 12, 1998, he bolstered his political standing.  
 
Klaus Kinkel, the foreign minister of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition, began 
promoting an intervention in early 1998 (Friedrich 2005: 35ff). Although he sought for 
reliability as a NATO member and acted according to this motivation (Friedrich 2005: 
55), Fischer‘s role is more central to the analysis as he was involved in decision-
making from September on—as discussed, the very point in time when fundamental 
decisions were made.  
Fischer‘s own acceptability-set comprised humanitarian concerns which manifested 
in adherence to diplomacy: He proclaimed the notion of ―never again Auschwitz‖ by 
declaring that ―taking action against Milosevic‘s regime was a moral imperative‖ 
                                            
10
 Author‘s translation: everybody in Germany and abroad can rely on this government living up to its 
political responsibility.  
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(Brummer 2012: 281). Paying attention to his party, he engaged in vivid diplomacy. 
When the USA called for a military intervention after the massacre of Racak in mid-
January 1999, Fischer persuaded Germany‘s allies to organize the Rambouillet 
conference as a last attempt to peacefully resolve the crisis in Kosovo (Friedrich 
2005: 78; Maull 2000: 3; Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011: 73). From January 1999 
on, when Germany took over the EU Council Presidency and the chairmanship of the 
G8, Fischer intensively used those international fora to foster a peaceful solution of 
the crisis (Hyde-Price 2001: 27) and include all parties to the conflict in an 
international dialogue, notably also Russia (Friedrich 2005: 84). In line with these 
achievements is the Fischer-Plan which ―significantly influenced the resolution of the 
Kosovo conflict‖ (Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011: 75) even though the bombing of 
Yugoslavia had already started. His undertakings may as well be seen as attempts to 
display German Bündnisfähigkeit (Fischer 2008: 86)—very similar to Schröder‘s 
eagerness of demonstrating continuity and reliance to Germany‘s partners. 
 
Since their parties had a strong pacifist wing, Schröder and Fischer struggled to 
contain those parts opposing an intervention in order to fulfill the agreement. 
Certainly, both parties–especially the Greens–constituted a serious domestic threat 
to the pro-intervention decision. By selectively mobilizing moderate groups of their 
parties, Schröder and Fischer could prevent involuntary defection (Hyde-Price 2001: 
25). By gaining their parties‘ support, the chancellor and the foreign minister served 
the vested interest of retaining power. Apart from that, Schröder und Fischer 
bargained according to the domestic win-set, so their actions can be described as 
close to the ideal type agent. As could be observed, they used the justification of their 
actions by reference to immaterial values, referred to as ―ideas‖ in the theoretical part 
of this thesis (Miskimmon 2009: 563). 
 
4.1.4 The Influence of Level I on the Domestic Game 
Not only the strategies of the chief negotiator influence the domestic win-set, but also 
the influences of other Level I negotiators and structures must be taken into account. 
The pressure which the USA exerted on Germany and the German self-perception 
shaping the expectation of Level I players stand out in this regard. 
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In March 1998, the US already pressed for quick sanctions in the Kosovo crisis 
(Friedrich 2005: 38). This attested their strong interest in resolving the conflict as 
soon as possible and if necessary, by military means. It was highly doubtful if 
Germany acceded to the NATO activation order (ACTORD) which initiated the 
planning of a NATO-led military campaign. Presumably, Milosevic counted on 
German rejection of the ACTORD, leading the USA to pile the pressure on Germany 
(Friedrich 2005: 52; Geis 2013: 248). Another reason was the quite unique German 
RECCE capacity needed for the air strikes (Overhaus 2009: 224ff). In the end, the 
US-strategy was one of success as it reverberated in Germany and influenced the 
German domestic win-set: by the end of September, US-President Clinton 
announced to vote in favor of air strikes (Friedrich 2005: 50). When Schröder and 
Fischer set forth on their first journey to Washington, DC on October 9, 1998, ―Clinton 
assured that the final decision could wait until government was formed‖ (Geis 2013: 
248). Notwithstanding his assurance, only three days later Clinton demanded an 
immediate decision which had than to be taken within 15 minutes (Friedrich 2005: 53; 
Maull 2000: 3), being ―urged not to veto any NATO action‖ (Denison 2001: 163). In 
the special Bundestag session on October 16, Schröder and Fischer translated this 
pressure to the need for alliance solidarityin an effort to win the majority of the MPs 
(Friedrich 2005: 54; Miskimmon 2009: 563). 
 
Alliance solidarity is also associated with the expectations of Germany‘s allies. The 
West integration is aforeign policy orientation that is followed axiomatically during the 
Kosovo crisis and its impact on the German government has already been addressed 
in part (see 4.1.3). Not only did the fundamental idea of West integration shape the 
behavior of German policy-makers, but also German multilateralism and reluctance 
to the use of force point to the fact that Germany sought to live up to its role concept 
(Friedrich 2005: 48). Or put differently, it acted according to the prospects of its allies, 
corresponding with those ideals. Then again, those expectations are reflected in the 
domestic win-set.  
As Russia successively retreated from the negotiations and the positions of Western 
and Russian negotiators hardened, Germany struggled to mediate the conflict 
(Friedrich 2005: 37). Later in the Kosovo war, after the Balkan Contact Group 
proceeded without Russian participation, a frequent exchange between Russian and 
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German diplomats took place. The pursuit of this strategy was successful when the 
G8 states under the chairmanship of Germany agreed on a set of principles which 
made a resolution of the conflict possible (Hyde-Price 2001: 28).  
Beyond the involvement of Russia, Germany‘s multilateral actions aspired to include 
the UN to ―gain some sort of post facto UN legitimisationof the militaryintervention‖ 
(Denison 2001: 164). Prior to the bombing, Germany intensively engaged in bilateral 
consultations with the UNSC members–above all Russia and USA–to reconcile the 
conflicting position (Friedrich 2005: 48), leading to UN resolution 1199 which 
demanded immediate ceasefire and retreat of the Serb forces from Kosovar territory 
(The Security Council of the United Nations 1998).  
With ―multilateralism at the very heart‖ (Maull 2000: 17) of the German foreign policy, 
it persistently went after a peaceful settlement of the conflict, even at last minute. 
After the Rambouillet conference–initiated at Germany‘s instigation—failed, Fischer 
travelled to Belgrade on March 8, 1999 in a last (and fruitless) attempt to peaceful 
resolution (Friedrich 2005: 81).   
The usage of multilateral institutions was the paramount vehicle of German policy 
behavior on Level I (Maull 2000: 12). When diplomacy had reached its limits, 
Germany participated in the war to maintain its Bündnisfähigkeit and to stop the 
atrocities in Kosovo (Auerswald 2004: 636), but it never stopped attempts to ―bring 
peace to the wider region‖ (Hyde-Price 2001: 27). 
 
It has to be emphasized that all of the above described actions served the purpose to 
gain and maintain domestic support (Maull 2001: 660). Had Germany not acted 
multilaterally or prematurely aggressive, it is safe to assume thatratification would 
have not succeeded. Thus, the role concept constrained German behavior, and the 
activities on Level I influenced the domestic win-set (Maull 2000: 12).  
 
4.2 Germany’s Abstention on the Intervention in Libya 2011 
 
During the course of the Arab Spring, Libya under the rule of Muammar al Gaddafi 
slipped into a civil war. The country was stricken by upheavals and was thus 
destabilized. As rebels gathered in the city of Benghazi and established an interim 
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transitional council, Gaddafi launched an offensive against the rebel stronghold 
(Lüders 2011: 106f). UNSC resolution 1970 condemned the use of violence against 
the population (The Security Council of the United Nations 2013a), but had no effect. 
So on March 17, 2013, the UNSC adopted resolution 1973, demanding a ceasefire 
and the establishmentof a no-fly zone over Libya (The Security Council of the United 
Nations 2013b). Resolution 1973 was, according to the provisions of the operative 
clauses, implemented and enforced by a NATO-led coalition in the OUP. Although 
the state of affairs in Libya was similar to the situation in Yugoslavia (Maull 2011: 
105), Germany abstained from the vote. For the purpose of this analysis, it can be 
assumed that the abstention is rather characterized as proactive opposition to the 
intervention in Libya than passive acquiescence (Miskimmon 2012: 401).  
 
4.2.1 The Domestic Actors 
Looking at this security policy decision in depth, one may find that two actors—the 
positioning of the parties in the Bundestag as well as the public opinion—and 
structural conditions of the German policy-making process play an outstanding role in 
delineating the win-set.   
It has been sketched what central role the Bundestag plays when it comes to 
deployment of German armed forces, so its overall sentiment shall be determined. 
Opposition against and consent to a possible military intervention ran across party 
boundaries (Miskimmon 2012: 399). In one of two parliamentary debates concerning 
the situation in Libya, the opposition voiced concerns that Germany has to act 
according to the principle of Responsibility to Protect11 (R2P) (Deutscher Bundestag 
2011b: 11151). On the other hand, Die Linke was the only parliamentary group 
opposing an intervention. Apart from that, the parliamentary party leaders of both 
opposition and governing parties shared the skepticism towards a military 
intervention in conversations with Foreign Minister Westerwelle (Rinke 2011: 51). 
The FDP refused to take a clear position and argues rather vaguely, being observed 
in the speech of Rainer Stinner:  
 
                                            
11
 The R2P describes that a state has the responsibility to protect its own citizens from atrocities. If a 
state fails to protect its people, ―this responsibility should be borne by the international community that 
can decide enforcement measures, including the use of force as a last resort‖ (Cooper and Kohler 
2006: V).  
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―Offen gesagt, stehe ich nicht mit einem fertigen Plan hier; den habe ich 
nicht. Das kann auch keiner erwarten. Ich sage Ihnen aber zu, dass wir 
dafür sorgen und einen Beitrag dazu leisten werden, dass die 
Bundesregierung alle Möglichkeiten ventiliert. Das fängt bei der 
Verstärkung der Sanktionen an. […] Wir müssen überlegen, ob die 
Sanktionen noch ein ganzes Stück verstärkt werden müssen […]― 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2011b: 11149).  
 
Observers argue that the FDP‘s positioning served to derive benefit from the situation 
with regard to upcoming federal electionsand therefore, heavily shaped the decision-
making behavior (Miskimmon 2012: 399; Oppermann 2012: 515). Moreover, in the 
week before the decision, the Bundestag was occupied with a variety of important 
issues, ranging from the Eurozone crisis to especially the nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima and its consequences for German nuclear energy policy (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2011a). Another obstacle to finding a consensus in the Bundestag was 
the ―speed of the diplomacy moving to the resolution [which] caught the parties by 
surprise‖ (Miskimmon 2012: 398). This very fact struck the government in a decisive 
manner. 
 
The German policy-making process tends to be slow as it is ―based on a dispersal of 
power and a system of checks and balances‖ (Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 27). 
Three days prior to the vote in the UNSC, Germany considered itself to be in line with 
the USA. This would have prevented that Germany, for the first time in its history, 
votes against its three closest allies, namely the USA, the United Kingdom and 
France. In the evening of March 15, Obama decided in favor of taking military action 
in Libya (Rinke 2011: 48). Germany only learned about the substantial change of 
position in the afternoon of March 16, and only then German officials first considered 
what position had to be taken in the UNSC voting (Rinke 2011: 49f). After few 
consultations, the government‘s choice had the character of an ad-hoc decision 
(Buchner 2013: 535; Greiner 2012: 75ff; Rinke 2011: 51). Voting in favor of the 
resolution within such a short amount of time, without extensive deliberations in the 
Bundestag which are typical for the policy-making process, could have likely resulted 
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in a failed ratification in the Bundestag, thereupon risking an immense loss of voters 
(Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 27).  
 
Jeopardizing the upcoming federal elections by conceding to the resolution was not 
completely improbable. The ―pacifist preferences‖ (Stahl 2012: 597, author‘s 
translation) of the German population became apparent in the weeks of the 
heightening debate over the Libya issue. 69 percent supported the abstention of the 
government (Oppermann 2012: 514f.) A poll on the day of the UNSC decision found 
that 86 percent opposed the involvement of German ground troops, whereas 56 
percent supported a no-fly zone with 34 percent opposing it (Stern 2011). This 
tendency is backed by another poll which found that 62 percent of Germans are 
supporting military engagement in Libya, but only 29 percent advocating participation 
of the Bundeswehr with 65 percent against it (Die Welt 2011). The German public 
opinion was not guided by influences of German decision-makers or the debate in 
newspapers since ―the arguments in German newspapers changed from week-to-
week‖ (Buchner 2013: 535). Additionally, the German public was intervention-weary 
(Hellmann 2011: 21) being constantly confronted with the experience of a war in 
Afghanistan in which German soldiers are engaged. In June 2011, 51 percent 
favored a retreat from Afghanistan, 19 percent at least a reduction of troops 
(Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 28). By no means, the German public wanted 
another participation of the Bundeswehr in a military conflict (Maull 2011: 110), 
having in mind that 7200 troops were already on duty outside of Germany 
(Miskimmon 2012: 567). The ―culture of antimilitarism‖ (Oppermann 2012: 509) in 
combination with a population skeptical of any further intervention clearly showed the 
public‘s stand.  
 
In the event of joining the intervention in Libya, the Bundestag would have had to 
decide about the deployment of forces. In light of the diverging opinions–within the 
parties in the Bundestag and the public opinion–gaining a majority would have been 
a doubtful and uncertain endeavor. Abstaining from the vote in the UNSC didnot 
require putting the decision before the Bundestag for a vote–or through the lens of 
two-level theory: the perception of a constraint mattered.  
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4.2.2 Cost-Benefit Calculation 
In order to uncover the preferences of the actors, the costs and benefits of the 
German decision to abstain have to be contrasted. Economic and security policy 
considerations come to the fore as well as populist and long-term consideration when 
going to war. 
First of all, Germanyvoted side-by-side with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
states, the biggest developing countries in the world economy. German ties with 
those countries are close and focal for the German economy which is largely 
dependent on exports (Kudnani 2011: 36). Taking into account the concept of 
Germany as a geo-economic power which ―increasingly define[s] its national interest 
in economic terms‖ (Kudnani 2011: 36), voting in accordance with these emerging 
nations could have politically substantiated the economic relations. This argument 
can be contrasted with the weak economic ties with Libya: in terms of export volume, 
it only ranked 66th, at the same time it ranked 38th for imports to Germany 
(Miskimmon 2012: 402). 
Simultaneously, the situation in Libya constituted no relevant security threat to 
Germany. Certainly, Germany had a vital interest in energy security, containment of 
migration, and the fight against terrorism (Werenfels 2009: 7), but the government 
was not willing to defend those interests by military means (Hacke 2011: 30). By 
early 2011, the government was occupied with the crisis of the Eurozone and on 
these grounds already deeply involved in multi-national crisis management. Opening 
up another frontline of crisis management could have overstretched Germany‘s 
willingness to provide multilateral capacities (Miskimmon 2012: 392-402). This falls 
into line with reforms of the Bundeswehr that restricted its use ―by the imperatives of 
budgetary consolidation‖ (Oppermann 2013: 28) and scaled down its capacities. 
Statements of Westerwelle provide evidence for this ―combination of economic 
assertiveness and military abstinence‖ (Kudnani 2011: 42): 
 
―Die Autorität unseres Landes in der Welt hängt nicht zuerst damit 
zusammen, dass wir über besonders starke Armeen oder militärische 
Ausrichtung verfügen, sondern dass wir mit einem besonders stark sind: 
mit unserer Wirtschaft.― (Meiers 2011a: 165) 
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Of course, it may be countered that these economic realignments are associated with 
a loss of trust among the allies (Annen 2011: 14). But it is justifiable to argue that the 
executive did not ―expect significant international costs from its non-participation in 
the intervention‖ (Oppermann 2013: 29). Equally, as has been described above, 
Germany considered itself to be in line with the US reluctance.  
 
The role of the upcoming federal elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-
Palatinate in the sense of retention of power is another facet of the cost-benefit-
calculations (Jones 2011: 55). Only four months before the elections took place, the 
FDP‘s poll rating dropped to a 15-year low of 3 percent (Spiegel Online 2010a). 
Bearing in mind the sentiment of the public, the foreign minister‘s actions were driven 
by the desire to influence the outcome of the elections. By ―adopting a high-profile 
and outspoken anti-war stance‖ (Oppermann 2013: 5), the ever so important 5 
percent threshold to be elected into the federal government ought to be reached 
(Miskimmon 2012: 399). Another aspect of the FDP‘s electoral strategy was to not 
provide the opposition with a target when voting in favor of a war (Hacke 2011: 52). 
Nevertheless, the tactics did not work as it was likely revealed as a ―tactical 
maneuver‖ (Maull 2011: 113).  
 
The argument featured most prominently was the concern about the uncertainty 
about the outcome of the military option. This notion was motivated by the 
experiences from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan where costly nation-building in 
the aftermath of the intervention had to be performed (Hacke 2011: 50; Miskimmon 
2012: 396f). One point put forward was that participating in the intervention could 
have resulted in Germany being drawn into a long-lasting military conflict with the 
―likelihood of large-scale loss of life […] and [a] military conflict that could draw into 
the wider region‘‖ (Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 25). The military involvements in 
Afghanistan and Kosovo were still on-going, and in both cases an end to the 
engagement was not yet feasible (Meiers 2011a: 164; Katsioulis 2011: 30). As 
Westerwelle put it,  
 
―[d]ie Bundesregierung betrachtet deshalb ein militärisches Eingreifen in 
Form einer Flugverbotszone mit großer Skepsis. Wir wollen und dürfen 
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nicht Kriegspartei in einem Bürgerkrieg in Nordafrika werden. Wir wollen 
nicht auf eine schiefe Ebene geraten, an deren Ende dann deutsche 
Soldaten Teil eines Krieges in Libyen sind. Aber was geschieht, wenn die 
Angriffe am Boden weitergehen? Müssen wir Gaddafis Panzer dann aus 
der Luft bekämpfen? Und wenn das nicht reicht, müssen wir dann 
Bodentruppen schicken?― (Deutscher Bundestag 2011c: 10815f) 
 
The concern that an air campaign might not be efficient and require the subsequent 
use of troops on the ground (Stahl 2011: 590) is reflected in the lack of intelligence 
about who the rebels were exactly and what objectives they were pursuing (Rinke 
2011: 47).  Those doubts were publicly brought forward by Germany‘s allies as well, 
which reassured themof their assessments (Rühl 2011: 6). 
 
The government of Germany anticipated costs and benefits under circumstances of 
high uncertainty: It was neither certain if the strategy aimed at the electorate would 
outweigh the costs of alliance disloyalty or if the intervention would lead to protracted 
military conflict that spread throughout the Maghreb. If the conflict had escalated 
according to the concerns, Germany would have relatively ―gained‖ from its decision. 
All in all, the principle of respice finem was at the core of the German decision-
making process (Ischinger 2011: 48). Despite uncertainty, the facets outlined give an 
account of the calculations that ultimately led to the German decision.  
 
4.2.3 The Role of the Chief-Negotiator 
Observing individual behavior and measuring its impact on decision-making always 
goes along with uncertainty. It can nevertheless be registered that Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle played a big part,whereas Chancellor Merkel‘s and Defense Minister de 
Maizière‘s roles were secondary (Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 27).  
Although Angela Merkel adopted a clear-cut position, viewing a military intervention 
with utter skepticism (Rinke 2011: 50), she was preoccupied with other pressing 
issues. The defense minister took office on March 2, thus it can be assumed that his 
influence was still marginalized by mid-March (Lindström and Zetterlund 2012: 27).  
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On the one hand, Westerwelle strived to distinguish himself as FDP‘s party chairman 
with regard to the upcoming regional elections and his own profile as foreign minister 
(Oppermann 2012: 515). By taking a decisive position, he sought to convey the 
impression of not being predominantly involved in domestic affairs, for this fact was 
frequently criticized (Spiegel Online 2010a). His rhetoric in the run-up to the UNSC 
decision was characterized by parallelizing the decision situation with regards to 
Libya to the one in the run-up of theIraq war 2003: e.g. did he use terms that are 
mostly negatively associated in the German public, like ―coalition of the willing‖ 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2011).  
On the other hand, his preferences have moreover been shaped by the beliefs he 
held and whose pursuance was demanded by his party (Oppermann 2013: 27). As a 
proponent of the German culture of restraint, he was in principal skeptical about the 
use of the Bundeswehr in foreign affairs (Spiegel Online 2010b). During the term of 
the grand coalition, he argued ―against German participation in specific multilateral 
missions‖, such as the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon (Oppermann 2013: 27). During 
the uprising in the Arab world, he encouraged the revolutionists to take care of their 
fate themselves and nourished an aversion to outside intervention (Oppermann 
2013: 23). 
 
All things considered, Westerwelle was not an ideal type agent. According to reports, 
Westerwelle even considered to vote against resolution 1973 (Lindström and 
Zetterlund 2012: 27; Oppermann 2012: 515). This constitutes a considerable 
deviation from the domestic win-set and can be considered to be in a hawkish 
direction. Notably, Merkel forbade a ―no‖–the only instance when her influence was 
relevant to the outcome. Westerwelle‘s acceptability-set was shaped by his beliefs 
and led by the desire to win popular support for his party and his own personality. By 
employing strategies of framing, he strived to influence the domestic actors. 
 
 
4.2.4 The Influence of Level I on the Domestic Game 
Influences of Level I on the domestic win-set are complex in the case of Libya. The 
behavior of Germany‘s bargaining partners had a relevant impact on the decision 
whether to abstain from voting or to reject resolution1973 in the UNSC, yet their 
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actions‘ effect was moderate. This can be understood by looking at the policy shift 
through the ―filter‖ of the role conception, which still affected the decision-making 
process, but also illustrates the evolution of how external expectations shape 
Germany‘s preferences: it did not put a premium on voting in accordance with its 
partners anymore–this is why Level I behavior only had a moderate impact.  
Germany supported the goals of UNSC resolution 1970 which condemned the 
violence of the Libyan regime, imposed an arms embargo and authorized the 
International Criminal Court with investigating war crimes in Libya (Maull 2011: 109; 
The Security Council of the United Nations 2013a). Germany nonetheless probably 
never intended to vote ―yes‖ on military actions against Libya and support such an 
endeavor (Sinjen 2011: 79). One indicator is the fact that Germany was resentful of 
French-British solo actions in a Brussels EU foreign ministers summit to conduct 
military action against Libya. German negotiators thus prevented the reference to a 
no-fly zone being included in the closing statement of the summit (Rinke 2011: 52). In 
Merkel‘s view, a big country like Germany would have to actively engaged in a 
military operation when voting in favor of a no-fly zone (Lindström and Zetterlund 
2012: 27), which was thus never an likely option. 
When the possibility of a resolution occurred rapidly, Germany had to decide whether 
to reject the resolution or abstain from voting. German policy-makers did not consider 
themselves to be isolated among the traditional NATO partners. After the USA 
questioned the French proposal to establish a no-fly zone and Portugal also opposed 
an intervention, this consideration seemed evident (Rinke 2011: 48-52; Stahl 2011: 
588). As has been showed above, events unfolded too quickly to provide the German 
government with sufficient time to make a choice.  
Even if the temporal factor had a slight impact on the government‘s decision-making 
process, its ―decisions on the use of force […] have become altogether less driven by 
a preoccupation with meeting the expectations of the Federal Republic‘s partners‖ 
(Oppermann 2013: 30). Clearly, the relevance of West integration, axiomatic 
multilateralism and reluctance to the use of force has lessened (Oppermann 2012: 
504ff). This evolution is embedded in an ongoing process since German 
reunification. The ―costs‖ of the role conception were greatand concerns about the 
damage of reputation among the allies were not, for Germany does not benefit to 
such an extent from the Western alliance anymore. Germany‘s long-term foreign 
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policy priorities do not perfectly correlate with those of its partners, so the obligations 
from the role concept are being perceived as burdening (Maull 2011: 114). With this 
new ―self-confident foreign policy‖ (Oppermann 2013: 30), domestic concerns take 
precedence over external expectations. Still, Germany remains a Civilian Power, 
adhering to peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution and supporting non-military 
sanctions in the framework of the EU and the UN (Maull 2011: 107; Meiers 2011a: 
172). In addition to that, Germany‘s behavior is barely unilateral: Within the NATO, 
the initiating directive for the no-fly zone–a routine preparation ahead of NATO 
operations–was backed by Germany. Germany also provided 300 additional soldiers 
for the AWACS reconnaissance mission in Afghanistan in compensation for the non-
participation in Libya (Maull 2011: 110; Meiers 2011b: 678; Oppermann 2012: 514). 
Germany debated as well about deploying the Bundeswehr for a mission to protect 
humanitarian campaigns for Libyan civilians (Meiers 2011b: 679).  
 
Due to the short sequences of events that led to the adoption of resolution 1973, no 
reverberations could take place. Level I had, nevertheless, an effect on the German 
government and therefore on the domestic win-set due to the interaction of both 
Levels. It can be inferred that the domestic level played the pre-eminent role what 
has been shown by elaborating on the role concept gradually evolving and 
diminishing the effects of external expectations on the win-set. All in all, the 
sanctioning elements of non-compliance with the traditional partners were so little 
that the main driver of Germany‘s decision is found on the domestic level.  
5. Conclusion: Review of the Empirical Findings 
Two similar cases have been examined by considering systemic and sub-systemic 
effects on the decisions the German government took. The puzzle of an 
unpredictable foreign policy that lacks orientation (Maull 2011) has been unraveled 
by employing a two-level approach to foreign policy decision-making. 
The selection of both cases seems viable, although there are important disparities 
between the Kosovo and the Libya case. The decision-making in Kosovo unfolded 
over a long period of time as the crisis slowly developed. Over the months, the 
structural conditions of German foreign policy decision-making were able to keep 
abreast with the events–the contrary happened in the Libya crisis.  
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An interesting finding is the reoccurrence of the same set of domestic actors. Apart 
from the executive, the constraining actors in both cases were the Bundestag due to 
its institutional role, but also the public opinion and the junior partner in the 
government. In 1998, the decision of the government to participate was put to vote 
before the Bundestag. In this instance, defection was unlikely as almost all parties 
were consensual and an overwhelming majority voted in favor of a military 
intervention. The possibility of defection–the perception that, if the parliament had to 
decide upon intervention, it could reject–was immanent in 2011. Policy makers did 
not involve the Bundestag since opposition to an intervention was strong throughout 
all parliamentary groups. This corresponded with the sentiment of the public opinion: 
Its resentments towards military action constituted a continuous constraint to the 
executive. As Putnam‘s theory predicts, a high degree of information leaves little 
room for hypothetically manipulating the public opinion. Neither agenda-setting nor 
the use of side-payments was exerted. In both cases, the informal veto-power of the 
public was crucial for the determination of the domestic win-set: the sanctioning 
element of audience costs, concomitant with the loss of votes, posed a serious and 
constant threat to the executives and the successful ratification of the international 
agreement.  
The public was highly mobilized in both instances as the beliefs and values at stake 
touched the very core of the public sentiment: going to war is highly controversial. 
Thus, leaders faced a high pressure to justify their actions: especially the party 
leaders of the junior party in the government coalition–foreign ministers at the time of 
the respective decision–had a focal part in this regard. 
 
The dichotomy of the decisions to intervene or not, respectively, was above all 
shaped by considerations in the domestic realm. Participating in an intervention in 
Kosovo seemed to be beneficial, even without a clear mandate by the UN. Germany 
could not only solve a serious problem with incoming refugees, the Balkans could 
also be stabilized in view of an imminent EU enlargement. In Libya, economic ties 
were not close and the security threat posed by an unstable Libya did not affect 
German as it affected other countries (Miskimmon 2012: 402f). Quite the contrary, 
being involved in a military operation could have resulted in a protracted military 
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conflict. This scenario should be excludable, with regards to electoral costs and 
economic loss. Costs and benefits shape preferences: The preferences in both cases 
are in accordance with the outcome of the German decision-making process. The 
respective decisions represent the overall domestic mindset of parties and public, i.e. 
they are in accordance with what Putnam‘s theory would predict as to the 
configuration of the domestic win-set.  
 
The chief negotiators as gatekeepers between Level I and Level II used their 
influence to pursue their own goals. Their individual preferences were compound of 
personal beliefs and concepts and the desire to enhance the political reputation. On 
the one hand, ideas mattered significantly: Schröder, Fischer in 1998-9 and 
Westerwelle in 2011 had personal convictions and publicly emphasized those 
convictions. Whereas Fischer‘s beliefs comprised a strong advocacy of peaceful 
means which found expression in diplomatic engagement and stopping of atrocities, 
Westerwelle favored the non-interference in affairs of foreign countries. On the other 
hand, both Westerwelle and Schröder hoped to capitalize on the decisions in order to 
counter their image as unexperienced politicians.  
 
It has been shown that a variety of Level I influences affected the domestic win-set. 
During the course of the Kosovo crisis, Germany acted according to its self-
perception as Civilian Power. It fostered multilateralism by using international 
institutions like the G8, the EU, the UN and the Balkan Contact Group. When the 
negotiations gridlocked due to dissonance between the West and Russia, Germany 
strived to ―keep Russia on board‖ (Friedrich 2005: 42; author‘s translation). The 
Rambouillet conference, as a last attempt to prevent the war, goes back to 
Germany‘s urging. As the war became unavoidable, Germany participated without 
contradicting the role concept (Raith 2005: 53).  
Clearly, Germany‘s domestic win-set was far more constrained by external 
expectations in the case of Kosovo than in Libya. Bündnisfähigkeit was of utmost 
importance to the government and this attitude was backed by the public. The role 
concept still played a role in 2011, but it evolved during the decade between both 
interventions. With the historical experience made in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the 
traditional role concept became too ―expensive‖. Germany granted itself more 
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freedom of action, since expectations of allies were now secondary and thus, 
domestic incentives moved into the focus of decision-making (Oppermann 2012: 
503): 
 
―Germany‘s enhanced role in multilateral military interventions and the 
increased willingness of German governments to frame their decisions for 
and against military deployments in terms of national interests are given as 
evidence for the ‗normalisation‘ of German foreign policy which is being 
portrayed as evermore power-conscious, assertive and self-confident‖ 
(Oppermann 2013: 2). 
 
To sum up, the achievement of combining the theory of two-level games with the 
Civilian Power concepts is a more detailed account of domestic factors and 
considerations leading to opposing decisions in similar international circumstances. It 
becomes more clear-cut what determines the domestic win-set. But not only is the 
analysis restricted to one situation, but employing the role concept enables to take 
into account long-term developments. Equally useful is the possibility to shed light on 
the agency level, i.e. the individual level of the decision-makers since its position is 
so critical to the two-level theory. All in all, by looking at domestic imperatives in both 
cases, the decisions seem to follow a complex rationale.  
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